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Putting uHuman Rights" Back into the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Shifting Frames 
and Embedding Participation Rights 
Tara J. Melish 
Framing is critical [to winning a public debate) because a frame, once established in 
the mind of the reader (or listener, viewer, etc.) leads that person almost inevitably to 
the conclusion desired by the framer, and it blocks consideration of other possible facts 
and interpretations.'- Framing expert, George Lakoff 
There is a critical question that is too frequently obscured in discussions of the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (CPs): Why precisely is it that 
the most vocal and consistent critics of the CPs are human rights organizati0ns, 
precisely the groups that have been pushing the longest and hardest for a more 
effective, non-business-as-usual approach to corporate human rights abuse? Indeed, 
whether big or small, North- or South-based, international or local in orientation, or 
highly or loosely networked, human rights NCOs have consistently taken a critical 
posture toward the CPs. Although their openness to CP engagement has v3;r-ied, • 
each has tended to see the CP framework as "regressive," a "step backward" in the 
protection of human rights,3 one based on a corporate good will model that not 
only has proven itself ineffective over decades of trial and creative experimentation,
4 
but, that - most revealingly and consequentially - ignores the critical elements of 
a human rights approach to social change. Indeed, in order to render the CPs 
1 George Lakoff, George Lakoff Manifesto 2, www.infoamerica.org/teoria_textos/manifiestoJakoff.pdf; 
see also: George Lakoff, The All New Don't Think of an Elephant/ Know Your Values and Frame the 
Debate (2014). 
• Groups that do not take a human rights approach to community-based problem-solving as the primary 
emphasis of their work have. been more open to engaging the GPs. In this respect, I am highly 
sympathetic to the framing used in Chris Jochnick's contribution to this volume, while believing 
that it may oversuggest differences in the substance of the critical postures taken by human rights 
NGOs (as a category) toward the GPs. See infra, note 5· 
3 See, e.g., FIDH et al., "Joint Civil Society Statement on the Draft Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights" (3 March 2011); Christopher Albin-Lackey, Human Rights Watch, "Without Rules: 
A Failed Approach to Corporate Accountability," in Human Rights Watch: 2013 World-Report (2013) 
(recognizing GPs as "woefully inadequate" by "setting a lower bar than international human rights 
standards"). 
4 Indeed, international efforts at corporate voluntarism in the human rights field have been vigorously 
pursued at the highest levels since the 196os. 
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acceptable to business, and thereby promote high-level corporate and state buy-in, 
the very essence of a "human rights approach" to community problem-solving- the 
core empowerment, participation, and accountability features that make the human 
rights idiom effective and useful to vulnerable communities and their advocates -
was systematically removed from the framework and its regulatory logic. The central 
challenge for human rights groups looking forward, then, is how to put the "human 
rights" back into the "business and human rights" (BHR) framework, either within 
the GPs themselves or in some other associated source of "law."5 
If one listens to John Ruggie - former Special Representative to the Secretary 
General on Business and Hun;Jan Rights (SRSG), intellectual author of the GPs, and 
principal promoter, defender, and publicist of those principles - one will none-
theless come away with a very different answer: Human rights groups, he repeatedly 
suggests, resist the GPs because they are stubbornly wed to a top-down, old-school 
model of global governance that has little place in today's highly complex and 
polycentric world. Indeed, in his campaign-like global efforts to defend the GPs 
from challenge, and forestall increasingly coordinated efforts to supplement them 
with more binding and participatory mechanisms (particularly through a new 
human rights treaty instrument), the former SRSG has adopted a highly powerful 
and politically resonant frame for understanding international debate on the GPs. 
6 
Aiming to move beyond the all-or-nothing "voluntary versus mandatory" frame 
long dominant in the field, that new frame seeks to resituate international debate 
along a spectrum of ideal global regulatory response types, That typological spec-
trum runs from "experimentalist" or "polycentric" governance regimes or regime 
complexes at one end (often gathered under a "new governance" heading) to rigid 
"command-and-control" treaty regulation on the other. Through this frame, the 
former SRSG is able to shift the axis of debate in a new direction while continuing 
to draw sharp and categorical distinctions between the GPs and the model they 
replaced, the UN Norms on Business and Human Rights (Norms).7 Though 
5 Human rights NGOs have tended to respond to the GPs in one of two primary ways: by rejecting their 
utility outright for influencing human rights conditions on the ground or by recognizing their utility in 
limited respects while insisting on their direct supplementation with additional human rights tools, 
instruments, and procedures to bring them, at a minimum, hack into line with.the hard-fought 
international standards already recognized in the human rights field. This is particularly true regarding 
the framework human rights principles of participation, accountability, nondiscrimination/equality, 
empowerment, and legality of rights, known as the "PANEL" principles. 
6 John Ruggie's recent book, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (Norton 
2013), is a revealing firsthand account of the campaign-like strategies of "meaning management" and 
staged endorsement the former SRSG has undertaken at the highest levels to promote the GPs, 
distance himself and his framework from human rights NGOs, and gain the backing of the business 
community and powerful states. 
7 As Professor Ruggie openly acknowledges, his "first official act [as SRSG] was to commit 
'Normicide"' - designed to establish a "clean break" from the Norms and, consequently, open the 
door to constructive engagement with the business community. It was achieved by concluding in his 
first official report- in "deliberately undiplomatic language"- that the Norms suffered from "exag-
gerated legal claims" and were "engulfed by [their] own doctrinal excesses." See Just Business, supra, 
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strongly supported by human rights groups, those Norms were of course rejected 
by the business community and failed to win approval within the UN Human Rights 
Commission in 2005, giving direct rise to the SRSG's mandate an,d process of 
drafting the GPs. 
The new frame operates by jointly locating the Norms and civil society calls for 
a cGmprehensive human rights treaty at one extreme end of the regulatory spectrum. 
They are based, the former SRSG insists, on an antiquated treaty-based regulatory 
model that has proven itself ineffective and ill-suited to modern global challenges. 
That traditional model- top-down, rigid, and highly prescriptive- presumes there is 
a singular "one-size-fits-all" approach to global problem-solving that every actor, 
everywhere, must uniformly adopt.8 The human rights paradigm, says the former , 
SRSG, is based on this rigid model, with advocates continually insisting there 
"ought to be a law, one single international law, which binds all business enterprises 
everywhere onder a common set of standards protecting human rights."9 Although 
human rights NGOs cling religiously to this model, the former SRSG asserts -
driving him "batty," as he likes to say, with their insistence that it is the only way 
forward - the model represents a nonstarter approach that, in contrast to the GPs, 
wlll offer no practical relief or recourse to real people in real situations on the 
groond.'0 
The GPs, by contrast, are located at the opposite, happier end of the global 
regulatory typology. They are presented as a fresli arid innovative example of 
a new global legal pluralism that takes a "polycentric" or "new governance" 
approach to global problem-solving." This "new" approach appreciates and values 
the diversity of stakeholders that need to be constructively engaged in twenty-first-
century problem-solving (including particularly businesses themselves), the plural 
pp. 54, 158. Ruggie regularly attributes the same "excess" to human rights groups calling for more 
mandatory supplementation to the GPs. 
8 See, e.g., John J. Ruggie, "A UN Business and Human Rights Treaty? An Issues Brief," (28 Jan. 204), 
3-4: John Ruggie, "International Legalization in Business and Human Rights," Remarks delivered at 
presentation of the Harry LeRoy Jones Award of the Washington Foreign Law Society, Washington 
DC (11 June 204), p. 4 ("One would think that this [top-down approach to international lawmaking, 
which seeks to squeeze the entire bundle of B&HR challenges into a single, all-encompassing treaty) 
would have lost its appeal by now, given its repeated failure to produce meaningful results"), 
9 Just Business, p. 55· See also John Ruggie's contribution's in this volume. The charge in fact turns the 
"human rights paradigm" on its head. 
10 See, e.g., Ruggie Remarks, ibid., note 8, p. 6 ("From the vantage of victims, an all-encompassing 
[B&HR] treaty negotiation is not only a bad idea; it is a profound deception."); John G. Ruggie, Letter 
to Editor, "Bizarre Response by Human Rights Groups to UN Framework Plan," Financial Times 
(19 January 2011) ("Do Amnesty and the [other human rights NGOs] really urge [the GP framework's) 
defeat- delivering 'nothing' to victims yet again? How much longer will they ask victims to wait in the 
name of some abstract and elusive global regulatory regime when practical results are achievable 
now?"). 
11 
• John Gerard Ruggie, "Global Governance and 'New Governance Theory': Lessons from Business and 
Human Rights," Global Governance 20 (204), 5-17 (describing GPs as "an exercise in polycentric 
governance"). ' 
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governance regimes they in fact respond to in their day-to-day operations (corporate, 
public, and civic), and creative ways for aligning interests across these distinct ~nd 
insufficiently intersecting regimes. The CPs are conceived to do precisely that, 
Ruggie asserts, and it is for this reason they have received such widespread support 
and institutional uptake across stakeholder groups. 
Deftly and repeatedly promoted by the former SRSG in his regular GP talking 
points and frequent public lectures, the frame is a highly effective strategy for 
promoting the GP project as the only real game in town. It creates a cognitive 
frame that, by placing the CPs at one ideal-type extreme and a .comprehensive 
human rights treaty on the other, leads the listener almost inevitably to the framer's 
desired conclusion: the CPs are good- their supporters are reasonable, flexible, and 
responsive to real world outcomes; comprehensive human rights treaties are Dad -
their supporters are rigid, doctrinaire, divisive and shortsighted in their singular 
quest for a treaty-based "silver bullet" that is hopelessly outdated and nonresponsive 
to the complexity and polycentricity of real-world problems.'2 
Though grossly misrepresentative of the actual·positions of the parties,'3 the 
heuristic serves the GP project well.'4 It guarantees steady business and Global 
North support of the CPs and GP implementation process (by framing their alter-
native as direct international legal regulation). It sidelines good faith calls for new 
treaty-based tools of accountability and participatory empowerment as extremist and 
regressive, blind and indifferent to the actual day-to-day needs of real people on the 
ground. It casts defenders of the GPs, including powerful businesses and Global 
North states, as the "true" defenders of human rights progress in the B&HR field. 
It also casts human rights NGOs (the CPs strongest and most effective critic~) and 
the growing number of Global South states supportive of a new treaty instrument in 
the field as obstacles to real progress, stubborn, and myopic in their ideological 
12 See, e.g., John Ruggie, "Progress in Corporate Accountability" (4 February 2013) (deriding human 
rights calls for more mandatory supplementation of the GPs as hopelessly based on "some idealized 
global command-and-control regulatory regime" that "risks turning the clock back rather than moving 
us forward"). 
' 3 Indeed, human rights groups are not now, nor ever have been, advocates of rigid command-and-
control regulation- and no human rights treaty has ever even remotely followed this approach. To the 
contrary, human rights advocates have for decades been at the forefront of global efforts to incorporate 
greater experimentalist and new governance features into regulatory regimes, particularly around 
increased stakeholder voice and participation, multiple and intersecting monitoring and account-
ability arrangements, interpretive flexibility, and responsiveness to local community-based priorities 
and understandings. This is core to what the "human rights framework" demands. Meanwhile, the 
GPs have come under heaviest attack for their failure to adopt the central features of "new govern-
ance" or experimentalist regime types. See Tara J. Melish and Errol Meidinger, "Respect, Protect, 
Remedy and Participate: 'New Governance' Lessons for the Ruggie Framework," The UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation ( ed.), R. Mares (Martin us 
Nijhoff Publishers 2012). 
4 See Rodrfguez-Garavito contribution in this volume (defending use of typology as merely 
a "heuristic"). As framing theory teaches, heuristics can misdirect thinking and action as much as 
they can direct it. 
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extremism and "doctrinal excess,"'5 and hence justifiably sidelined in the process of 
implementing the GPs and their "new regulatory dynamic." The frame thus leads, 
by design, not only to the general conclusion that human rights groups and other 
civq society NGOs can, even should, legitimately be bypassed in the GP implemen-
tation process (including in the work of the new UN Working Group tasked with its 
promotion), but also- most relevantly for this volume- toward proposals for moving 
the GPs "beyond the en'd of the beginning" that maintain intact the framework's 
elite-centred, internationalist, and voluntarist logic, while merely tinkering with 
details at their outer margins. Indeed, by seeking "intermediate pathways" between 
the two ideal regime types, such proposals lose the 'core of what is at stake and 
actually in contention. 
It is here that my central critique of the original background contribution to this 
volume by Cesar Rodrfguez-Garavito rests. Although the author correctly identifies 
the principal deficiency of the GPs from a human rights (and new governance/ 
experimentalist) perspective'6 - that is, the framework's failure to take systematic and 
explicit account of the critical role played by" empowered civil society participation" 
in closing the massive governance gaps that pervade the field - the author's uncri-
tical embrace of the former SRSG's frame'7 leads him to a bewilderingly impover-
ished set of proposals for addressing that deficiency. The chapter is thus a powerful 
testament to the effectiveness of the former SRSG's chosen frame. It demonstrates 
how that frame not only leads large numbers of listeners to the "conclusion desired 
by the framer" (that the GPs are the only real game in town, and hence efforts to 
expand their content in the form of a treaty or other regulatory instrument are either 
fundamentally misguided or simply impractical), but also "blocks consideration 
of other possible facts and interpretations,"'
8 including, most critically, the actual 
reasons human rights NGOs insist that the GPs require more mandatory and 
expressive supplementation. 
A new frame for situating international debate on the GPs is critically needed. 
Part I below offers what I see as a far more accurate frame. Parts II and III then use 
this frame to rethink answers to the two key questions identified by Rodrfguez-
Garavito for constructively taking the GPs "beyond the end of the beginning": How 
can "empowered civil society participation" effectively be incorporated into the 
' 5 See note 7 above. 
'
6 For an analysis of the overlap between "new governance" and "human rights" approaches to 
regulatory problem-solving, see Tara J. Melish, "Maximum Feasible Parti~ipation of the Poor: New 
Governance, New Accountability, and a 21St Century War on the Sources of Poverty," Yale Human 
Rights and Development Law Jouma/13: 1 (2010). 
' 7 See Rodrlguez-Garavito in this volume. In the original background version of his chapter, the author 
locates the GPs within a typology of global regulatory responses that, he asserts, runs from "treaty-
based regulation" at one end of the regulatory spe~trum to "voluntary standards and polycentric 
governance" at the other end. He then locates the GPs at the latter end, and incorrectly calls it "new 
governance." 
'
8 See note 1 above. 
Shifting Frames and Embedding Participation Rights 81 
CPs' "dynamic logic"? And what role, if any, does a human rights treaty instrument 
have to play? 
I SHIFTING FRAMES: COMPETING THEORIES 
OF SOCIAL CHANGE 
If the principal competing visions of the CPs do not run along an "experimentalist 
versus command-and-control" spectrum, along what continuum do they run? 
As I see it, the core international debate on the CPs is one that straddles not two 
distinct governance or regulatory regimes, but rather two distinct theories of how 
social change or system transformation is most.effectively influenced in complex, 
powered society. It is the fundamental divergence between these two theories of 
social change and, most importantly, the respective toolsets required to advance 
them that explains human rights NGOs' skepticism toward the CPs. Let me 
explain. 
Like other UN global design projects. that John Ruggie has played a leading role in 
developing (e.g., the Global Compact and Millennium Development Goals), the 
CPs are based on a particular acoulturative theory of system transformation, known 
in international relations theory as social constructivism or sociological institution-
alism. Professor Ruggie is an important intellectual progenitor of this theory.19 Very 
simply stated,20 the theory posits that individual actors in global society (states, 
business entities, civil society groups) act in particular ways primarily because they 
are socialized into certain behavioral patterns, largely by the shared norms and 
norm-informed practices of their self-identified global reference groups. The most 
effective way to modify "bad" behavioral patterns within such groups is thus to 
influence the shared cultural systems through which appropriate conduct is norma-
tively defined in a given community. A particular methodology is identified to aff~ct 
this normative shift. It has three core components: (1) "authoritative" adoption of 
a standardized international script for global uptake, (2) structured and framed in 
a way that will promote voluntary buy-in and formal uptake by the relevant reference 
groups, and (3) promotion of international processes designed to stimulate elite 
engagement with script norms and other reference group elites, leading to voluntary 
uptake, mimicry, and standardization of policy forms across the group. 
Through these elite e'ngagement processes, it is theorized, norms come to be. seen 
as part of the reference group's self-identity. When this "tipping point" is reached, 
individual components of the global script become embedded and internalized as 
a new set of constitutive rules that define and prestructure the scope of socially 
' 9 See, e.g., J. G. Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Nco-utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge," International Organization 52.:4 (1998), Sss-885. 
"" For a more complete description in the GP context, see Melish & Meidinger, note 13 above. For 
Ruggie's own description, see above. 
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acceptable conduct in the field." The resulting taken-for-granted quality of the 
underlying norms is henceforth able to resolve the misaligned incentive structure 
and co11ective actipn problems that, in the ijHR context, the former SRSG attributes 
to the absence of consensus regarding appropriate policy forms and outcomes. 
Keeping businesses and states engaged in the GP "implementation process" -
understood as formal uptake practices across a widening group of actors - is thus 
fundamental to the project's "success.'' It explains the former SRSG's confident 
pointing to elite international (OECD, IFC, EU, AU, ASEAN, ISO) formal uptake 
practices as "evidence" of successful GP implementation (wholly independent of 
any translation into policy change on the ground).
22 It also accounts for his resistance 
to, even antagonism toward, civil society's insistence on more mandatory norms and 
other participatory levers for engaging in "accountability politics" from below, as 
weB as the UN Working Group on BHR's steely focus on script dissemination and 
high-level corporate actor engagement in its international meeting spaces (rather 
than serving a role more akin to other Human Rights Council Special Procedures, 
which tend to prioritize spaces for civil society engagement).· 
Human rights groups: by contrast, tend to view this account of social change as 
simplistic, naive, and incomplete. T.hey insist that genuine social transformation 
occurs only when affected communities themselves have the power and voice to 
engage decision-making processes that affect their lives, as active subjects oflaw, not 
mere objects. From their perspective, human rights abuse occurs for one primary 
reason: powerlessness. People will continue to be abused while they lack power -
power to understand, to challenge, to confront, and to engage the causes and 
conditions of their abuse. Critically, they must do this themselves, as active subjects 
of the law, not passive objects thereof. Indeed, any model of change based on other 
people "- especially the very ones responsible for misconduct - doing this for them 
(whether out of humanitarianism or direct self-interest) is misguided at best, a status 
quo power play at worst. Interests are too strong, and the power of dominant groups 
to whitewash, elide, ignore, agenda-set, influence-peddle, and misrepresent too 
great.23 
The CPs are a "step-backward" for human rights groups, then, for two related 
reasons. First, they fail to recognize the essential role that rights-holders themselves 
21 See, e.g., Just Business, pp. 166--169 (describing CPs implementation logic in terms of three phases of 
the "life cycle of norms" - norm emergence, norm· cascade, and norm internalization - an
d 
concluding that "[a ]mong the main international standard-setting bodies" and "leading multinationa
l 
corporations" the first two phases are effectively complete, while the latter phase has just begun). 
,. See, e.g., Just Business, pp. 121-123 (triumphantly describing "swift uptake" of CPs by international 
standard-setting bodies); John J. Ruggie, "A UN Business and Human Rights Treaty? An Issues Brief," 
(28 Jan. 2014), p. 2 (same, while conceding that "no systematic assessment is available of overall results 
to date"). 
•3 For a powerful overview of the corporate sector's highly organized public relations strategies aim
ed at 
reframing the UN agenda on B&HR, see Jens Martens, "Corporate Influence on the Business and
 
Human Rights Agenda of the United Nations" (Working Paper, Brot fur die Welt/Global Polic
y 
Forum/MISEREOR, June 2014). 
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play in identifying (indeed defining what constitutes) abuse, its causes, and contex-
tually appropriate mechanisms, arrangements, and procedures for preventing it in 
the first place. Instead, the CPs envision processes of human rights policy develop-
ment and decision-making as unfolding in a primarily top-down unidirectional 
fashion, with corporate actors determining what is required consistent with corpo-
rate self-interest and self-identity (and isomorphic mimicry of forms). That is, driven 
by elite-centered ideational incentives and the idea that corporations are or should 
be human rights leaders as a matter of constructed self-identity, the CPs contemplate 
no power shift between stakeholders whatsoever. Corporations and .powerful states 
are the active agents and norm entrepreneurs at their "dynamic" center, while rights-
holders and their civil society advocates remain bystanders and onlookers, passive 
"beneficiaries" of outsider good will. Indeed, while corporations "should" consult 
with such communities, they have no obligation to nor consequence for not so 
doing. 
It is this disregard for direct rights-holder engagement and participatory access to 
agenda-setting processes that leads to the second core human rights critique of the 
CPs: The framework's failure to offecany express tools or legal resources to affected 
communities such that rights-holders themselves have the power and capacity to 
engage the causes of their own abuse.'4 Such rights-building tools would enable 
communities to better understand the field-specific scope of their rights, the neces-
sity of community-based mobilization around them, the correlate duties held by 
other social actors (both substantive and procedural), and how such duties may 
effectively be leveraged to shift the dynamics of decision-making toward the protec-
tion of human rights, in locally responsive ways. This deficiency is true both in the 
inexpressiveness of the CPs' terms (in relation to both rights and duties)'5 and in their 
lack of reference to any rights of participation or institutional pathways for the real-
world exercise thereof. Given the massive power and information disparities that 
prevail in the corporate domain, such legal resources are vital for the exercise of 
bottom-up accountability politics by vulnerable communities.'6 It is little wonder, 
"~ As used here, "legal resources" refer to those normative tools and institutional pathways through 
which affected persons and communities can know their rights, stand up to defend them when 
aggrieved, and actively engage in the day-to-day praxis of empowered participatory governance in 
matters that affecttheir lives. See generally Clarence J. Dias and James C.N. Paul (1985), "Developing 
Legal Resources fo'r Participatory Organizations of the Rural Poor," Third World Legal Studies Vol. 4, 
Article 2. 
•; The GPs have been recognized as a primary exemplar of an "inexpressive international instrument" 
given their failure to articulate clear commitments on the part of social actors, to which other social 
actors can hold them to account. See Andrew K. Woods, "Inexpressive International Agreements" 
(unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
'
6 Accountability, in this regard, means that "some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of 
standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to 
impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met." R. W. Grant and 
R.O. Keohane, "Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, American Political Science 
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then, that the GPs have attracted so little knowledge or buy-in by affected commu-
nities anywhere in the world. They simply lack the tools to be meaningful or relevant 
to local level struggles against corporate abuse. 
The result is a BHR governance regime fertile with opportunities for "creative 
compliance" and other forms of "greenwashing" or "decoupling." That is, compa-
nies predictably take the cue to engage in highly formalistic uptake practices 
designed to legitimize brands and avoid exposure by activists, while failing to engage 
in any genuine ground-level operational change.27 Examples abound. Such exam-
ples give direct voice to the human rights concern that ideational incentives and 
voluntary efforts to "know and show" will not, by themselves, meaningfully change 
conduct on the ground. Localized, independent, and regular checks on power and 
interests, backed by the credible threat of material consequences and penalty 
defaults (whether social, economic or legal) by those stakeholder groups most 
affected by corporate misconduct, are indispensable to "success."28 To do this, 
however, rights-holders need to be recognized as central to the process of defining 
problems, envisioning solutions, setting agendas, destabilizing expectations, mon-
itoring compliance, and incentivizing behavior. Equally critically, to ensure rights-
holders can exercise those roles in fact, they need to be provided an expressive set of 
rights-based leverage tools for asserting their voice and socially amplifying their 
power.29 
It is toward remedying these two deficiencies that NGO calls for more mandatory 
and expressive GP supplementation -particularly through a human rights treaty-
are directed. As I read them, such calls seek three primary things: (1) more expressive 
commitments on the part of global actors that set clear principles and broad standards 
and goals for achievement (not rigid, one-size-fits-all rules, which, by definition, are 
not responsive to local needs and experiences); (2) a framework and instituted 
processes through which those goals can be pursued by the full range of stake-
holders, including particularly those most affected by corporate misconduct; and (3) 
express rights of participatory engagement to enable rights-holders themselves to 
•7 The GPs'limited "remedy" prong provides little meaningful relief in this context. It does not entitle 
affected communities to engage in problem-solving, agenda-setting, and regular monitoring of 
business-related human rights harms, but rather only to seek (allowable) redress once discretionary 
abuse has already occurred. 
z8 For an important example, see the Coalition oflmmokalee Workers Fair Food Program, described as 
"one of the great human rights success stories of our day" and "the best workplace monitoring 
program" in the United States. See http://ciw-online.orglfair-food-program. See also Melish, 
"Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor," note 16 above (describing strategies of "new account-
ability" movements across Global South and North). 
"9 See generally Gniinne de Burca, Robert 0. Keohane, and Charles Sabel, "New Modes of Pluralist 
Global Governance," NYU Journal of International Law 6 Politics 45 (2013) (concluding that 
"successful" experimentalist governance regimes and practices "depend on extensive and open 
participation of civil society actors in agenda setting, revision, and ongoing problem solving ... 
Enlarging the circle of decision-making, and keeping it accessible to new participants is a condition 
of success) (emphasis added). For an application of this argument in the human rights arena, see 
Melish & Meidinger, note 13 above. 
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engage the framework on an equal basis alongside other stakeholders, including 
accounting for failures. 
Such calls, it demands emphasis, are consistent not only with a human rights 
approach to social change (with its focus on promoting the agency, power and 
dignity of the socially situated rights-holder), but also with the very logic of experi-
mentalist governance. Indeed, genuine experimentalist systems are recognized to be 
constituted by four core elements: 1) the articulation of a broad framework for setting 
general goals or standards in a participatory manner; (z) local units (public and 
private) pursuing the goals in locally appropriate ways; (3) regular reporting and peer 
review by a variety of stakeholders; and (4) a system for revising goals, metrics and 
decision-making procedures "by a widening circle of actors in response to the 
problems and possiDilities revealed by the review process."3° The GPs and their 
UN follow-on activities are neither structured nor envisioned to do any of this. 
Rather, they merely assume that it will be done by others- somewhere, somehow-
ignoring entirely the power differentials and structural barriers that prevent it from 
happening in fact. To frame them as'"experimentalist'' and "polycentric" thus not 
only misapprehends what is required·of such governance regimes- namely, open 
stakeholder access and exercisable rights of participation at all stages of design, 
monitoring, accountability, and review- but dramatically distorts the lines of debate 
about what critics find wanting in the GPs and how they wish to update them. 
Reframing the debate is critical. 'By more accurately understanding international 
debate on the GPs as a contest between those who advocate elite-driven 
acculturation-based models of social influence (the former SRSG, the WG, corpo-
rate interests, many Global North states) versus those who insist on bottom-up 
accountability politics (affected communities, human rights NGOs),
31 the contours 
of where "intermediate pathways" lie becomes much clearer. Indeed, assertions to 
the contrary notwithstanding, human rights advocates do not reject acculturation-
based strategies (like the GPs) when promoted as, one of multiple relevant and 
important strategies of social influence.3
2 What they "reject" in the GP framework 
;o Sabel and Zeitlin, "Experimentalist Governance," in D. Levi-Faur (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Governance (Oxford Univ. Press 2012.), 169-183; see also "New Modes of Pluralist Global 
. Governance," note 30 above (iden~ifying five similar components). 
3' • While human rights NGOs uniformly insist on more mandatory or expressive rights of civil society 
participation, independent oversight, and accountability, they do differ in their willingness to speak 
"for" affected communities in exercising those rights. On a typological spectrum running from· pure 
acculturation-based strategies of social influence to pure power shifting ones, then, some will locate at 
the extreme latter end, while others will move toward a more centered position, explaining their 
higher openness to GP engagement. Compare Chris Jochnick, Chapter 7, in this volume. 
3' By focusing on the operational limits of the Working Group and hence recommending the "replace-
ment" of its current mandate with a different, more rights-holder centered mandate, Rodrfguez-
Garavito nonetheless moves oddly (and seemingly unwittingly) in this direction. The better option 
would be to envision different orchestrational bodies or sites for engaging these distinct modalities of 
influence, as other treaty-based human rights regimes do. See, e.g., CRPD and its Optional Protocol 
(creating an oversight committee with periodic reporting and individual complaints functions and, 
separately,' a Conference of States Parties for peey-to-peer stakeholder learning). The creation of 
86 Tara J. Melish 
is the virtual unitary focus on top-down acculturative dynamics, together with its 
promoters' dismissiveness, even antagonism, toward more rights-holder-centered 
and bottom-up accountability strategies. These latter strategies, human rights groups 
insist, are indispensable not only in themselves, but also for the very viability of 
norm-based acculturation processes; they serve to ensure that a "logic of conse-
quences" spurs, incentivizes, destabilizes, and disrupts logjams in processes geared 
toward embedding a "logic of appropriateness."33 
Indeed; as even acculturation-based models' most ardent defenders acknowledge, 
acculturative forces do not invariably increase respect for human rights; they may 
in fact lead to worsening and more dangerous human rights conditions on the 
ground.34 Designing a human rights regime exclusively, or even primarily, around 
such forces is thus shortsighted and counterproductive. Rather, optimal human 
rights regime design requires that attention be given not only to interest discovery 
among elite players, but also to interest conflict and how less powerful actors seek to 
narrow power asymmetries through organized mechanisms of social (legal, eco-
nomic, political) leverage. A "business and human rights" framework makes little 
sense without it. Human rights NGOs and affected communities should thus be 
expected to continue to reject the GP framework as "the authoritative focal. point" in 
the B&HR field35 - or even "authoritative" at alJ36 - while rights-holder empower-
ment and participatory engagement are not made a more systematic institutional 
feature. 
'II EMPpWERED CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION: HOW TO GET 
THERE? 
Consistent with the above critique, Rodrfguez-Garavito rightly focuses on the need 
for greater attention in the GP framework to "empowered civil society participation" 
and the availability of institutional pathways for the exercise of countervailing 
power. Nevertheless, by falling for the framing convention set out by the former 
SR.SG, his reference points become skewed and he ends up advancing proposals that 
bear little relationship to the actual problem diagnosed. In short, he advances two 
proposals for moving the GP implementation process forward: (1) pursue a treaty, 
but one narrowly limited to corporate responsibility for "gross" human rights 
a separate UN Special Rapporteur on B&HR, to complement the work ofthe current Working Group, 
would be a first step in this direction. 
33 John Ruggie seems to recognize this in his early work as SRSG. See, e.g., J.G. Ruggie, "Business and 
Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda," American Journal of International Law 101 
(2007), 836. ('The Achilles heel of self-regulatory arrangements to date is their undeveloped account-
ability mechanisms"). 
34 R. Goodman and D. Jinks, "Incomplete Internalization and Compliance with Human Rights Law: 
A Rejoinder to Roda Muchkat," European Journal of International Law :z.o (:z.oo9), 443-444· 
35 The former SRSG continually presents and promotes the GPs as such. 
36 Accord Bonita Meyersfeld, Chapter u, in this volume. 
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violations (and states' associated extraterritorial obligations); and (2) replace the 
current mandate of the UN Working Group (WG) tasked with GP orchestration 
with one more like other UN special procedures in the human rights field. Neither, 
I contend, will have any appreciable effect on shifting power to vulnerable 
communities. 
Simply stated, the treaty proposal errs by assuming (in line with the SRSG's 
frame) that the "comprehensive treaty" desired by human rights NGOs is one that 
would rigidly codify a set of highly prescriptive rules for corporations that every 
business entity, everywhere, must uniformly adopt. Understood as such, the 
logical "intermediate pathway" between' the CPs' current "dynamic logic" and 
civil society's preferred "treaty route" lies precisely where Ruggie and the author 
jointly locate it: (1) reducing the subject-matter scope of the desired command-and-
control treaty (hence the former SRSG's insistence on a ''precision tool"); and (2) 
limiting its jurisdictional application to those few "bad apples" who are uninfluence-
able by the elite-driven social constructivist logic of the CPs- that is, those engaged 
in the "worst of the worst" violations rising to the level of international crimes 
(genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, etc.). 37 The proposal, concededly, 
makes perfect logical sense under one critical condition: you buy into· the frame. 
If you don't, it entirely misses the mark. Indeed, by misidentifying the position of 
human rights NGOs (who favor a very different kind of "comprehensive treaty," 
I believe),38 the proposal is entirely nonresponsive to the "countervailing power" 
critique. It fails to create any new tools of participatory empowerment or institu-
tional engagement for the millions upon millions of communities the world over 
affected by negligent and abusive conduct in the business domain. The proposal 
instead favors a regime that states have already rejected in the Rome Statute,39 and 
that will be so politicized, distracting, and selectively deployed (given the Global 
North's power and structural interest in protecting its own)- and so dominated by 
the usual narrow band of international criminal law suspects- as to be nonrelevant 
to local struggles and actors on the ground. 
The WG proposal is similarly deficient, but for a different reason. By focusing on 
international "orchestration," it puts the cart before the horse. It fails to address the 
core reason so few affected communities know or care about the CPs in the first 
place-and hence have reason to substantively engage them at all, at international or 
local levels. Indeed, if' the type of "empowered civil society participation" that the 
human rights critique envisions is to be incorporated into the CPs' "dynamic" 
implementation logic, the CPs themselves must acknowledge it and provide some 
37 See, e.g., John Ruggie, Chapter 2, in this volume. 3
8 See discussion below Part III. 
39 Negotiators of the Rome Statute expressly declined to extend its jurisdiction to "legal persons," like 
corporations, for participation or complicity in precisely the international crimes identified in the 
Ruggie proposal. Why states would change their positions on this so quickly is unclear to me, 
especially as national trends seem to be moving in the opposite direction. And if they did, why create 
a new instrument rather than simply amend the Rome Statute or create an option'al protocol thereto? 
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set oflocally meaningful tools to promote it and hence enable local buy-in. Without 
doing this, creating limited new spaces for engagement in international WG activ-
ities will serve only to increase the marginal participation of those civil society actors 
who are already empowered to participate in high-level fora like the WG, and, to 
a large extent, are already participating therein (albeit to a lesser degree than 
corpotate interests).40 
A far. more basic update to the GPs and their implementation logic is required. 
In a 2011 piece, Errol Meidinger and I proposed one way that key participatory 
empowerment tools· could be incorporated directly within the GP framework. 
We proposed incorporation of a fourth "Participate" pillar into the "Protect, 
Respect and Remedy" Framework (enlarging it.modestly to a PRRP Framework).41 
By building express recognition of the critical role of civil society actors directly into 
the GP framework itself, we envisioned three distinct but closely related value-added 
benefits. First, it would elevate an expressive commitment to the participatory rights 
of civil society actors to the same normative platform .held by state and corporate 
actors, thereby providing a normative base from which they could demand equal 
attention and participation in the implementation process. Such a platform would 
. make it difficult for state and corporate actors to simply dismiss or sideline civil 
society actors, as they so frequently do, in the process of constructing national action 
plans, new regulations, "human rights due diligence" processes, and community 
"consultation" designs, consistent with their (inexpressively framed) duties under 
the current GPs. In so doing, it would likewise serve to complement, contextualize, 
and dynamize the "Remedy" pillar, making clear that affected communities are not 
simply post~hoc grievance holders, entitled to speak up and be heard only after harm 
has occurred. Rather, it would recognize unmistakably that they have critical and 
indispensable roles to play at all stages of decision and policymaking affecting their 
lives- including at the design stage, before harm occurs, and in continual monitor-
ing, agendq-setting, awareness-raising, and review processes. 
Second, and most instrumentally, incorporation of a fourth "participate" pillar 
would provide the structural foundation for the concrete elaboration of a series of 
cross-cutting (and expressively framed) GPs dedicated specifically to operationaliz-
ing a participatory role for civil society actors,at each key stage of"implementation." 
Applicable across public law and corporate governance systems, such operational 
principles would recognize civil society's right to participate in, for example, the pre-
award review of concession contracts; the conduct of prior impact studies; the 
development of National Action Plans;42 the indepehdent monitoring and review 
40 See also contribution by Bonita Meyersfeld in this volume (noting that the GPs have been engaged by 
"empowered actors in empowered places"). 
4' See Melish & Meidinger, note t3 above. 
"' For an important effort in this regard, see Danish Institute for Human Rights & International 
Corporate Accountability Roundtable, National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights: 
A Toolkit for the Development, Implementation, and Review of State Commitments to Business and 
Human Rights Frameworks (June 2014), pp. 42-44 (calling on all governments to develop NAPs and to 
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of corporate grievance procedures, due diligence plans, and complaint mechanisms; 
as well as other recognized national and international-level monitoring and account-
ability arrangements. They would also include key safeguards regarding access to 
information, transparency, and participatory accessibility, as growing numbers of 
treaties have done in BHR related fields, including corruption, the environment, 
and the workplace.43 By expressly recognizing these cross-cutting participatory 
governance principles as central to the duties to "protect" and "respect" in the 
framework, key ly':erage points would be created through which civil society' actors 
could more meaningfully insert themselves, as a matter of right, into a wide range of 
on-the-ground implementation processes.44 The experimentalist character of the 
framework as a whole would thereby be strengthened, far more actors would be 
induced to engage it, and hence far larger "cumulative effects'' could be generated 
across governance domains.45 
Third, and again closely related, an expressive set of•rights and participation-
enabling duties under a fourth pillar would serve to enhance and expand sites of 
independent implementation oversight, especially those most accessible and nor-
matively open to rights-holder engagement. Indeed,· because the GP framework does 
not contemplate specific institutional mechanisms of independent compliance 
oversight (such as an individual complaints procedure or periodic reporting regime), 
a "participate" pillar would provide important normative contact points with the 
existing human rights architecture, including National Human Rights Institutions, 
UN special procedures, and human rights tribunals (national, regional, interna-
tional). For such bodies, rights-holder participation, voice, agency, and access are 
guiding framework principles. While the former SRSG likes to reference the 
"implementation" capacities of international investment, banking, financial, and 
other "economic law" institutions, including OECD National Contact Points, these 
are not the kinds of procedures to which affected communities have ready access or 
to which they are )ikely to turn. Creating more contact points with national and 
international institutions designed to promote and defend the rights of the least 
ensure effective participation by all relevant stakeholders through stakeholder mapping, capacity-
building, and ensuring participation by disempowered or at-risk stakeholders). 
43 See, e.g., UN Convention Against Corruption, pmbl., arts. 5, 6, 10 and especially i3 ("Participation of 
Society"); Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) (1998); UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, pmbl., arts. + 3, 33, etc. [hereinafter CRPD]. 
44 A "participate" pillar would thus function in a parallel manner to the "remedy" pillar. While that 
pillar may formally be cast as a "duty'' or "responsibility" in the framework, it is in practice regularly 
invoked as a right of civil society actors, including by the former SRSG. See, e.g., "Global 
Governance," note 11 above, pp. 5, 9 ("For affected individuals and groups, the GPs stipulate ways 
for their further empowerment to realize the right to remedy.") (emphasis added). 
45 In this sense, the proposal fit seamlessly into the former SRSG's emphatic articulation of the core aim 
of the GP framework: to close regulatory gaps by creating more effective and dynamic alignme;1t 
between state, corporate and civil society governance systems, allowing each. to mobilize more 
effectively to reinforce each other's strengths, address each other's weaknesses, and act as mutual 
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powered is thus critical. This is particularly true in light of the increasing "fragmen-
tation" of international law, and hence imperative of finding ways to promote 
interpretive convergence across governance regimes,46 while, at the same time, 
helping to ensure that the CPs do not continue to fall behind evolving standards 
in the human rights field. 
Other longer-term methods could of course be proposed for achieving similar ends 
outside the CP architecture. One good example- one I support, as detailed below- is 
the adoption of an international treaty instrument expressly recognizing the partici-
patory rights and roles of civil society in all stages of the implementation process, .as 
other recent human rights treaties have profitably (and without controversy) done.47 
Our proposal was simply that the same expressive commitment made to "respect," 
"protect," and "remedy" should be made with respect to civil society "participation," 
recognizing it not only as a right under international law but as an indispensable 
element of polycentric governance regimes. One that both state and corporate actors 
have a duty/responsibility to ensure, and which,·as a cross-cutting and intersectional 
principle of human rights law, requires Its own set of guiding principles to ensure 
effective operati~nalization across governance systems. Without this being done, we 
were confident that the issue of participation would be reduced to a side-note and 
taken off the table.48 Indeed, as the initial volume contribution itself recognizes, the 
CPs do·not incorporate civil society participation as a systematic institutional feature 
in their current elaboration, stating merely and weakly that corporations should 
"consult" with potentially affected communities in assessing human rights "risks" 
(Principle 18). Whether they do so or not, and, most critically, how they do so, is 
entirely up to their own discretion. Stated another way, within the present CP frame-
work civil society actors are left bereft of any express normative toolset to demand their 
effective participation in CP implementation processes as a matter of right. 
It is useful to recall in this regard, the literature on expressive commitments in 
international (and national) law. That literature understands expressiveness as one 
of thl! key functions of law. It allows states and other actors to clearly and publicly 
manifest a commitment to some principle above and beyond whatever obligations 
are imposed. That public manifestation of commitment serves important intrinsic 
and instrumental ends. Most significantly, it allows a range of social actors to hold 
those who commit to account for their commitments.49 Critically, this is true 
46 Ruggie, "Global Governance," note u above (noting impacts of fragmentation). 
47 CRPD, note 44 above, arts. 4-3, etc. 
48 In the 204 conference giving rise to this volume, Professor Ruggie objected that such a "participate" 
pillar would have been a political impossibility given certain rejection by states (like China and 
Russia) - and even by civil society actors themselves. This posture nonetheless seems to ignore the 
large number of treaties that are regularly adopted by states with civil society "participation rights" 
embedded expressly within them (see, e.g., note 44 above) as well as civil society's organized 
protagonism in demanding such embedding. • 
49 See, e.g., Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics 
(Cambridge 2009). See also Robert Cialdini, Influence: Science and Practice (1985), pp. 92-103 
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regardless of whether those commitments are publicly manifested in a formaily 
binding instrument (e.g., a treaty) or nonbinding one (the CPs). The key distinction 
in this regard is not necessarily between binding and nonbinding commitments, but 
rather between expressive and inexpressive ones.50 Expressive commitments are 
sticky; they encourage a wide audience to monitor their- implementation and insist 
on implementation. Inexpressiveness may serve short-term political ends, but also 
carries large opportunity costs. Most relevantly in the GP context, it removes the 
power of civil society actors to use principled commitments to make those commit-
ments stick. That is, to insist on them not as a privilege granted at another party's 
discretion, but as a normative right authoritatively recognized as a principle of 
conduct in a human rights-respecting society. 
Are there additional ways to directly incorporate such "sticky" norms into the GP 
framework? Certainly. For instance, civil society groups could organize and sponsor 
the drafting of a set of ~·supplementary Guiding Principles" that addressed the 
participation anp accountability issues left out of the CPs - drawing on and cross-
referencing, perhaps, the UN Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human 
Rights, which do make participatory empowerment of affected communities 
a central institutional feature.5' Such groups could then lobby states, the Working 
Group, and other special procedures to request the Human Rights Council to 
endorse the formal updating of the CPs as a short-term priority. 
A different, albeit far less effective and authoritative approach would be to 
encourage the we to prepare a thematic report that directly addressed the right to 
participate in GP implementation processes at all levels. It could invite participatory 
interventions by all stakeholders and focus on "best practices" that have been 
adopted with respect to ailowing civil society participation in a wide range of 
processes encouraged by the CPs. An obvious downside of this approach is that 
the we has already, in its first thematic report on indigenous peoples' rights, 
manifested a disinclination to recognize fully and robustly the participatory rights 
of affected stakeholders under current internationallawY Such an approach, if 
pursued in isolation, could then set the participatory project backward, rather than 
taking it forward, even while years would pass before the we produced any 
deliverable. While the WG's current membership will soon change, its institutional 
reluctance to robustly address participation issues is undoubtedly tied closely to the 
scope of its mandate, itself intimately linked with the acculturative regulatory logic 
of the CPs. It is unlikely, then, that the WG will significantly change its approach to 
this issue. Likewise, thematic reports prepared by special procedures lack author-
itative standing among many stakeholders; they could not serve to authoritatively 
(collecting research showing that people who commit and have their commitments publicized are 
more likely to keep their commitment, even after the publicity is over). 
5o See Woods, note 25 above. 
5' A/HRC/:n/39; HRC Res. 21/11 (27 September 2011.) (adopting GPs by consensus). 
5' See AIHRC/WG/rJ./3h. 
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embed participation within the GP framework, such that it became part· of the 
"dynamic regulatory logic" that drives jt,53 
The surest path forward, then, lies in a dual approach: the organized pursuit 
of a substantive updating of the GP framework with more expressive rights of 
participation, while simultaneously pursuing the longer-term project of negotiating 
a treaty instrument that would make those "soft" expressive commitments to parti-
cipatory governance "hard" for states under· international law. Indeed, as studies 
show, human rights commitments are "stickiest"- and hence most "mobilizable"-
when those commitments have been made not only expressively but also through 
binding treaty law. 54 I turn to that critical longer-term proposal below. 
III A BINDING TREATY: WHAT, WHY AND BINDING ON WHOM? 
Calls for a treaty on business and human rights have of course been made recur-
rently for over half a century. On 26 June 2014, the UN Human Rights Council took 
an important, if preliminary, step toward that inevitable development. Responding 
to the coordinated proposals of over ninety states and over 500 civil society organiza-
tions, it agreed to establish an Open-Ended Working Group to consider elements of 
an international treaty on business and human rights. As discussions begin on what 
those elements should entail, one thing is clear: the heavily promoted idea that 
human rights groups demand a "command-and-control"-style treaty that directly 
binds business under international law must be left at the door. Let us be clear: 
No human rights treaty has ever followed that model, and human rights groups have 
never promoted it in any human rights treaty negotiation. It is inconceivable to me 
that they would do so in the BHR context. 
Rather, the kind of BHR treaty that human rights NGOs and affected commu-
nities are most likely to support is one that -like other human rights treaties- follows 
an experimentalist approach and focuses on three elements: (1) defining rights in 
flexible but expressive terms that resonate with the lived experience of rights-holders; 
(2) embedding express civil society participation rights as tools of engagement 
throughout its structure and implementation logic, and (3) clarifying states' duties 
to take all necessary and appropriate measures to respect, protect and ensure human 
rights as they are impacted by corporate misconduct. In each of these respects, 
I suggest, the most useful and relevant model lies with the UN's most recently 
adopted human rights treaty: the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
5> See Albin-Lackey, note 3 above (recognizing problematic nature of GPs "setting a lower bar than 
international human rights standards" since "many companies now see the principles- incorrectly-
as the world's definitive, one-stop standard for good human rights practice. There is a risk that many 
companies will simply ignore standards the Guiding Principles do not echo.") (emphasis added). 
54 See, e. g., Simmons, note 49 above; AdamS. Chilton, "The Influence oflnternational Human Rights 
Agreements on Public Opinion: An Experimental Study," Chicago Journal of International Law 15 
(2014). 110. 
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Disabilities (CRPD). Below, I very briefly note the key elements thereof that are of 
greatest likely relevance to discussions on a new BHR Treaty.55 
·A Flexible, but Expressive Commitments 
First, the CRPD does not rigidly prescribe conduct, but rather incorporates a set of 
flexible, expressive, and experientially· resonant terms designed to enable a wide 
range of actors to engage them as tools of leverage, mobilization, and participatory 
engagement-in their diverse local struggles. Indeed, largely at the insistence of rights-
holder groups and their civil society allies participating in the drafting process, 5
6 the 
UN Committee charged with its negotiation carefully avoided "shopping lists" and 
overspecification of details and standards as an agreed operational modality. It did so 
precisely to ensure that the Convention's text would remain relevant and vital over 
time, space, and context. It is thereby capable of responding to new challenges and 
modes of abuse as they arise, as well as the vastly different challenges faced by 
differently situated rights-holders and duty-bearers across the world. It also wished to 
avoid the negative inference that anything not expressly included in a detailed 
provision was intended to be excluded. Thus, broadly exemplary terms with inclu-
sive references and a higher level of generality were consistently preferred to overly-
specific, narrow.ly tailored ones or "lists" of.abuse and standardized implementing 
measures. The same will undoubtedly be true oLa BHR Treaty. 
B. Embedding Participation Rjghts 
Second, to ensure that rights-holders can in fact engage in processes directed at 
a meaningful incorporation of their rights into policies, practices and procedures 
that affect them, the CRPD focused on embedding rights-holder participation rights 
and institutional pathways for their exercise (what I call "participation nodes'!) 
throughout its text and dynamic implementation logic. "Full and effective partici-
pation [of rights-holders] and inclusion in society" was thus affirmed repeatedly as 
a core guiding principle of the treaty, reiterated in the Preamble, Purpose, and 
General Principles. The treaty likewise codified it as a central obligation of all 
States parties. The "General Obligations" clause. thus commits all public actors, 
under a "shall" provision, to "closely consult with and actively involve persons with 
disabilities [PWDs] .... [i]n the development and implementation of legislation 
55 Space constraints prevent fuller discussion and analogy between the disability and B&HR contexts. 
For more on the CRPD, see, e.g., Tara J. Melish, "The UN Disability Convention: Historic Process, 
.Strong Prospects, and Why the U.S. Should Ratify," Human Rights Brief 14(2) (2007); Tara J. Melish, 
"An Eye Toward Effective Enforcement: A Technical-Comparative Approach to the CRPD 
Negotiations," Human Rights and Disability Advocacy (Sabatello and Shulze (eds.), Penn Press 2.013). 
56 See Gniinne de Burca, "The EU in the negotiation of the UN Disability Convention," European Law 
Review Vol. 35, No. :z. (:z.o10) (hypothesizing that CRPD's highly experimentalist character was driven 
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and policies to implement the present Convention, and in other decision-making 
processes concerning issues" affecting their lives. 57 These same participatory rights 
and duties were repeated and made more operationally specific with respect to key 
substantive rights, monitoring arrangements, information collection and accessibil-
ity, compliance regimes, and oversight systems. 
Let me note just a few provisions given their importance for a BHR treaty. First, 
the provision on national-level implementation and monitoring affirms unambigu-
ously that "[ c )ivil society, in particular [PWDs] and their representative organiza-
tions, shall be involved and participate fully in the monitoring process."58 Another 
provision specifically requires states to ensure "effective monitoring" by "indepen-
dent authorities" of ''all" facilities and programs designed to serve PWD, whether 
public and private.59 State parties are likewise required to collect and disaggregate 
data for purposes of policy formulation, and to ensure its accessibility to PWD. At the 
same time, the CRPD expressly commits States to the establishment of national 
implementation machinery specifically tasked with responsibility over the treaty's 
subject matter. It is to and through these instituted processes that rights-holders can 
direct their collective concerns, demands, inputs and organized oversight. They 
include (1) a focal point or focal points within government to oversee implementa-
tion of the treaty; (2) a coordination mechanism to ensure coherence in policy and 
action across the public sphere; and (3) a set of independent monitoring mechan-
isms (like NHRis) with competence over the treaty's effective implementation. With 
respect to each of these, states commit to ensure full civil society participation, 
particularly by the treaty's rights-holders themselves. The same is true of the treaty's 
international supervisory machinery. 
Given the massive power and information disparities that pervade the BHR field, 
there is little doubt that the same kinds of overlapping commitments to participatory 
rights of acc;ess to decision-making structures and processes - at local, national and 
international levels -should likewise drive the logic of any new BHR treaty. 
C. Specifying States' Duties 
Finally, for highly instrumental and operationally pragmatic reasons, human rights 
treaty law has remained centered on clarifying states' duties to respect and ensure 
human rights. This is true even as human rights law is increasingly applied to every 
imaginable kind of private conduct. It is indeed precisely in recognition of this 
reality that the CPs focused on the state (legal) duty to protect human rights from 
business-related abuse. And, yet, while few dispute the general existence of this duty 
under international treaty law, there remains significant uncertainty about its sector-
specific operational contours. Indeed, corporate actors have amassed such broad and 
powerful rights across legal borders that ·it is increasingly unclear where their 
57 CRPD, art. 4·3· 58 CRPD, art. 33 (emphasis added). 59 CRPD, art. 16.3 (emphasis added). 
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prerogative ends and what role public law has to define and constrain it. It is precisely 
here, then, in clarifying the state legal duty to respect, protect, and ensure rights to 
affected communities, that a "carefully constructed precision tool" is most needed. 
In this regard, the forrqer SRSG's repeated assertion that such a treaty would.not 
"add value" is unpersuasive. It indeed misconstrues the purpose and content of all 
specialized treaties in the human rights domain. Such treaties do not create "new" 
rights, but rather serve as precision instruments in clarifying the scope and specia-
lized content of more generally articulated rights and duties with respect to highly 
abusive subject areas lorrg marginalized or ignored in national agendas and main-
stream human rights procedures. Correspondingly, the most valuable role for a BHR 
treaty lies in more expressively articulating states' obligations under international 
law to regulate corporate conduct; to prevent abuse from occurring (through safe-
guard measures, regular oversight, monitoring, etc.); to respond to abuses when and 
where they occur, diligently and with a view toward guaranteeing against future 
violations; and to ensure civil society participation and independent mechanisms 
for monitoring, oversight, and dynamic regulatory response, at local, national and 
international levels alike. 60 
A precision instrument of this kind would indeed serve multiple power shifting 
ends. Not only would it create stronger, more precise leverage tools for rights-holders 
and their advocates to engage states' wrongful acts and omissions directly, but it 
would also address the elephant in the room: States themselves need new legal tools 
of empowerment and leverage to be able to regulate and monitor in the business 
domain. Increased legality and treaty-based specificity around state obligations 
thus serve to enhance opportunities for state-civil society alliances (often pursed in 
adversarial terms, but understood covertly as collaborative), while, at the same time, 
allowing states to expressively self-bind and hence gain legal leverage to assert 
themselves in their own regulatory role6' (including in multistate or r~gional 
arrangements across the Global South). It is little surprise, then, that the principal 
proponents of a comprehensive treaty are Global South states and civil society 
organizations - precisely those with least power and fewest rights vis-a-vis the 
massively resourced and legally powered corporate sector. 
IV LOOKING FORWARD 
In his initial contribution to this volume, Cesar Rodrfguez-Garavito invites an 
immensely important and timely project: creative conversation and strategic think-
ing from a variety of global voices on the "dynamic dimension" of the GPs. In other 
6o Specialized human rights treaties thus virtually always include o~ligations clauses that are longer and 
more articulated than those found in general instruments. 
6
' See generally Karen J. Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights (Princeton 
Univ. Press 204) (discussing state delegation of jurisdiction to international fora as a way to self-bind 
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words, their "capacity to push the development of new norms and practices that 
might go beyond the initial content of the CPs," thereby ensuring "cumulative, step-
by-step progress" in improving companies' real-world compliance with human 
rights standards. I salute this initiative and hope that my small contribution here 
will aid it in two ways. First, by encouraging a critical rethinking of the dominant 
frames used to pro.mote and explain the CPs in public debate, with particular 
attention to the damaging ways those frames have served to sideline and marginalize 
the voices, roles, and strategic insights of affected communities and their human 
rights allies. Second, by helping to ensure that conversations moving forward remain 
solidly focused on identifying and promoting the tools, procedures, and resources 
that affected communities themselves need to participate - actively and meaning-
fully- in the policy and decision-making processes that so affect their lives. If those 
goals are achieved, I believe, a foundation will have been built upon which we can 
indeed move the CP framework "beyond the end of the beginning." 
